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PUBLIC FORUMS-IS THE AIRSPACE ABOVE A PUBLIC
FORUM ALSO A PUBLIC FORUM?-THE NINTH
CIRCUIT'S NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC
FORUM DOCTRINE RESULTS IN ANOTHER BARRIER
FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: CENTER FOR BIO-
ETHICAL REFORM, INC. V. CITY & COUNTY OF HONOLULU
JESSICA A. SHERIDAN*
T HE NINTH CIRCUIT recently upheld a municipal ordi-
nance that prohibited aerial tow-banners against an advo-
cacy organization's charges of First Amendment free speech
violations.1 A principal issue of first impression was whether the
airspace directly above the public beaches of Honolulu was a
public forum for purposes of free expression.' The court chose
to narrowly interpret the public forum doctrine in a way that
conflicts with the First Amendment's rationale, policies, and
goals. The Ninth Circuit's holding further restricts speakers
from exercising a fundamental guarantee of the Constitution-
the right to free speech.
The Center for Bio-Ethical Reform (the Center), challenged a
municipal ordinance that prevented it from utilizing aerial ad-
vertising as part of an advocacy campaign.3 The Center is a pro-
life advocacy organization that uses airplanes to tow large
graphic banners of aborted fetuses over densely populated ar-
eas.4 The Center received permission for its aerial advertising
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the form of
a Certificate of Authorization (Certificate). 5 The Certificate
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2008. The author would like to thank her brother, David A. Thompson for his
constant encouragement and support.
I Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910,
915 (9th Cir. 2006).
2 Id. at 919.
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permits the Center to tow its banners in "the contiguous United
States of America, Alaska, Hawaii & Puerto Rico" but the Certifi-
cate does state it "does not constitute a waiver of any state law or
local ordinance. '"6
The State of Hawaii has a long history of attempting to regu-
late expression for the sake of its aesthetic interests.7 The ordi-
nance at issue in this case, ordinance § 40-6.1, (the Ordinance)
prohibits aerial advertising, but makes exceptions for certain
limited commercial uses.8 The Ordinance effectively restricted
the Center's aerial advocacy campaign over the beaches of Hon-
olulu and the surrounding coastal waters.
Consequently, the Center filed suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, asserting that the Ordinance violated its right
to free speech under the First Amendment.' The United States
Court for the District of Hawaii denied the injunction, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed that ruling.' Both the Center and the
city of Honolulu filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and
the district court granted summary judgment for Honolulu."
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision and
found that: 1) the airspace above the municipality and county
was a non-public forum; 2) the Ordinance was viewpoint neu-
tral; 3) the Ordinance was reasonable; and 4) the Ordinance did
not foreclose a unique and traditionally important mode of ex-
pression for which there was not a practical substitute.' 2
The Ninth Circuit considered the three classifications of pub-
lic property used in First Amendment analysis: 1) public fo-
rums, 2) government designated public forums, and 3) non-
public forums, and determined that in light of its history, pur-
pose, and physical characteristics, the airspace at issue was a
non-public forum. 13 A non-public classification of property is
important as it subjects the government to a more lenient stan-
6 Id.
7 See Runyon v. Fasi, 762 F. Supp. 280, 281 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding Maui's
ordinance prohibiting political campaign signs unconstitutional); Hawaii v. Dia-
mond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825, 826 (Haw. 1967) (involving a local ordinance
regulating outdoor signs).
s Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 915-16.
9 Id. at 916.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 919-23.
13 Id. at 919.
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dard of constitutional scrutiny. 4 The court cited Preminger v.
Principi'5 in defining a public forum as "a place traditionally de-
voted to expressive activity."'" In concluding that the airspace's
history and purpose did not constitute a public forum, the court
considered the FAA's strict regulations of airspace, the ordi-
nance itself, and the notion that the use of airspace to tow ban-
ners is a modern creation. 1
7
The court also ruled that the physical characteristics of the
airspace did not support its categorization as a public forum and
rejected the Center's argument that the airspace above the
beaches was merely an extension of the beaches below.'8 The
court based this reasoning on United States v. Grace,'9 which held
that spatial proximity to a public forum is determinative only if
the two areas are indistinguishable."' Here, the Ninth Circuit
decided the airspace above the beach was distinguishable from
the beach because of physical separation, the requirement of
special equipment to access the air, and the authorization re-
quired for access. 21 Because the court concluded the airspace
was not a public forum, it evaluated the Ordinance's constitu-
tionality under the less restrictive standard of reasonableness
and viewpoint neutrality. 22 The court determined the Ordi-
nance was viewpoint neutral because it restricted all types of
speech except certain identifying trademark symbols on the ex-
terior of aircraft. 23 When evaluating reasonability, the court de-
termined that reasonable meant "consistent with preserving the
property for its dedicated purpose. '24 In applying this defini-
tion, the court relied on Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,2"
and found that preserving aesthetics and promoting safety are
well established in the law as legitimate goals. 26 The court then
14 Id.; See also Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678-79 (1992).
15 422 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2005).
16 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 919.
17 Id. at 919-20.
18 Id. at 920.
19 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
20 Id. at 179.
21 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 920.
22 Id. at 921 (citing Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 321 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
23 Id. at 922.
24 Brown, 321 F.3d at 1222.
25 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981).
26 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 922.
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noted the district court's findings of the particular importance
of preserving Hawaii's aesthetics and tourism industry.2 7
Finally, the court ruled that the Ordinance did not "foreclose
a traditionally important medium of communication or leave
the Center without a practical substitute. '2 The court cited Ko-
vacs v. Cooper29 to support its statement that no constitutional
right exists to engage in the cheapest, easiest, or most far-reach-
ing mode of communication.30
The Ninth Circuit chose to further suppress freedom of
speech when it narrowly construed the airspace as a non-public
forum. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that public
property constitutes a public forum if it has been "opened for
public use as a place for expressive activity."'" In determining
whether the government has opened a forum to the public, a
court must evaluate the policy and practice of the government,
the nature of the property, and its compatibility with expressive
activity.3 2 The Ninth Circuit erroneously considered only Hono-
lulu's airspace, and not the character of airspace in general,
when finding there was no intentional opening of the airspace
by the government.3 3 In contrast, when evaluating whether an
airport had been opened by the government as a public forum,
the United States Supreme Court considered the nature of air-
ports generally and referred to airports as a class. 4 Here, air-
space generally qualifies as a federally designated public forum
because the FAA, through its certificates of authorization, has
intentionally opened United States airspace for commercial and
political aerial speech. 5 The Ninth Circuit also immediately dis-
missed the question of whether airspace is naturally compatible
with expressive activity, without an explanation as to its reason-
ing. Here, the very fact that the FAA had made certificates avail-
able demonstrates that at least some organizations have found
airspace to be compatible with expressive activity. Further, the
27 Id. at 922-23 (noting the district court's findings in Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Re-
form, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1134 (D. Haw.
2004)).
28 Id. at 923.
29 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
30 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 924-25.
31 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
32 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
33 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 920.
34 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-82
(1992).
35 Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 455 F.3d at 916.
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Center's brief specifically indicated how utilizing aerial advertis-
ing was conducive to expression and speech.3"
Even if the court was correct in finding the FAA had not in-
tentionally opened up the air space as a public forum, the air-
space above the public beaches should be considered a public
forum for the purposes of expression directed at persons on the
beach. Here, the airspace directly above the beaches is not com-
pletely distinguishable from the beaches below. The United
States Supreme Court held that the steps on the United States
Supreme Court building were indistinguishable in location and
purpose from the adjacent public sidewalks and noted the lack
of a fence or other physical separation. 7 The United States Su-
preme Court distinguished this from a previous case where it
had found that the sidewalks and streets within an enclosed mili-
tary base were completely separate from the public sidewalks
and streets." Here, unlike the military base, no tangible physi-
cal separation exists between the beaches and the air directly
above the beaches. Additionally, airspace above land has been
viewed under property law's ad coleum doctrine as an extension
of the land below.39 Furthermore, in defining a forum, the fo-
cus should be on the access sought by the speaker.40 Thus, what
should be evaluated is not just the airspace, but the airspace di-
rectly above the beaches. Here, the Center's advocacy efforts
were specifically directed to and intended to reach persons on
the public beaches. The Center merely used technology in the
form of aircraft to reach persons on public property-the
beaches. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Justice
Kennedy noted that the Supreme Court has allowed flexibility to
meet changing technologies in areas of constitutional interpre-
tation and argued that such flexibility should be applied to the
public forum doctrine.4' The Ninth Circuit should have applied
36 Brief of Appellant at 9, Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & County of
Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-17496).
37 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983).
38 Id. (distinguishing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836-38 (1976)).
39 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1766);JEssE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 141 (5th ed.
2002) ("to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the
depths").
40 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801
(1985).
41 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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such flexibility and ruled that the airspace was a public forum
based on the access sought by the Center.
Next, in evaluating reasonableness, authority exists for the
proposition that aesthetic interests do not overcome a speaker's
constitutional right to free speech. For instance, the United
States Supreme Court noted that aesthetic interests in prevent-
ing litter were not compelling reasons to prevent the expression
of one's views. 42 The United States Supreme Court also invali-
dated an ordinance that placed significant prohibitions on out-
door advertising despite the city's argument that it was justified
on the basis of traffic safety and aesthetics. 4 Furthermore,
when determining whether a government restriction on speech
is reasonable, the speech at issue itself should also be evaluated.
For example, the United States Supreme Court, when finding
that a restriction against solicitation in an airport was reasona-
ble, considered the interaction required, the opportunities for
fraud, congestion, security problems, and the effects of delaying
passengers.44 Based on the facts, the Center's speech was not
inherently disruptive. The Center's banners were not as intru-
sive as solicitations and did not require any interaction from its
audience. Moreover, the leisurely activities of people on the
beaches were unlikely disrupted in the way that the activities of
travelers in a busy airport would be. Because the aesthetics were
the main reason offered in support of the Ordinance, and be-
cause the speech at issue was silent and non-intrusive, the Ninth
Circuit should not have ruled that the Ordinance was
unreasonable.
The suppression of speech in this case was also unconstitu-
tional because the Center lacked a practical substitute to express
its message to the Honolulu public. The expression was unique
in that graphic photographic images were the topic of the com-
munication. Because of the existence of Honolulu's other re-
strictive ordinances that prohibit traditional billboards and
other expressive signs,45 the prohibition against tow-banners
greatly limits the methods in which the Center can communi-
cate. Further, although not determinative, cost-effectiveness
and convenience are factors to be considered when determining
42 Schneider v. NewJersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
43 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521 (1981).
44 Int'l Soc y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680-83.
45 Brief of Appellant at 9, Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & County of
Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-17496).
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whether there is a practical substitute. 46 Here, because of the
controversial subject matter of the expression, leafleting or
more personal forms of communication would likely pose a
safety problem for the Center's volunteers. In addition, because
the Center is a non-profit organization, it would be unlikely that
expensive outlets such as television and radio would be practical
substitutes. Thus, based on the facts, the use of tow-banners was
a method of communication for which there was no practical
substitute.
In determining whether the Ordinance violated the First
Amendment, the Ninth Circuit addressed a case of first impres-
sion: whether the airspace above a public area constituted a pub-
lic forum. The United States Supreme Court explained that
forum analysis was developed as a means of determining
whether "the [g]overnment's interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those
wishing to use the property for other purposes. 47 Allowing in-
terests in tourism and aesthetics to prevail at the expense of a
constitutional right is contrary to the goals of the First Amend-
ment. A right to free speech and self-expression, especially po-
litical speech, should not be restricted to areas where it can be
comfortably accommodated. In relying on confined technical
definitions, the court ignored the grave consequences for the
future exercise of free speech. Justice Kennedy's remarks per-
taining to a discussion on public forum analysis are particularly
relevant to the current facts. He wrote:
Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of
categories rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis
protective of expression into one which grants the government
authority to restrict speech by fiat ... the purpose of the public
forum doctrine is to give effect to the broad command of the
First Amendment to protect speech from governmental interfer-
ence. The jurisprudence is rooted in historic practice, but it is
not tied to a narrow textual command limiting the recognition of
new forums.4"
Additionally, Justice Souter's concurrence in the same case
stressed that the most important considerations are whether the
property shares physical similarities with traditional public fo-
46 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994).
47 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985).
48 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 693-94, 697 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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rums, and whether the government has permitted or acquiesced
in broad public access.49 The property at issue shares physical
similarities with traditional public forums because it consists of
air above a public area and because the speech is directed at
persons in that public area-the beaches. Furthermore, the
FAA's certificates permitting the use of aerial tow-banners in all
fifty states certainly demonstrates acquiescence.
A consequence of such a narrow interpretation of the public
forum doctrine will be to stifle free political expression and de-
bate, a fundamental value upon which our nation was founded.
Unless our courts conduct forum analysis in light of the goals of
the First Amendment, a multitude of mediums available
through new technologies will be excluded and will conse-
quently be unavailable to political speakers. We have entered a
new millennium where technology continues to increase effi-
ciency and affect every aspect of our lives; freedom of expression
must not be suppressed and narrowly confined to parks, side-
walks, and streets. The Ninth Circuit's decision is inconsistent
with the fundamental goals, policies, and spirit of the First
Amendment.
49 Id. at 710 (Souter, J., concurring).
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